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Abstract 
This paper presents a methodological approach for the analysis of tax incidence that
encompasses familiar forms of taxation in a general and analytically convenient model. In
oligopolistic industries, the performance of a tax depends on the sensitivity of the unit tax
rate to changes in industry output. Output-elastic tax schedules are less likely to be
over-shifted and have superior welfare properties relative to regulatory instruments that are
less responsive to the equilibrium market quantity. For revenue neutral tax reforms, the
ﬁnding of Delipalla and Keen (1992) that ad valorem taxes welfare-dominate speciﬁc taxes
under oligopoly is derived as a special case of this general result. 
Keywords: Oligopoly; Conjectural variations; Tax incidence; Ad valorem taxation; Degres-
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1. Introduction 
Despite numerous possibilities for taxation in oligopolistic industries, formal
analyses of tax incidence have tended to focus on a narrow range of policy
instruments. Two forms of commodity taxation frequently considered are the unit 
(or speciﬁc) tax and the sales (or ad valorem) tax. The objective of this paper is to
examine oligopoly taxation through a considerably more general regulatory lens. A
methodology is employed for the analysis of tax incidence that encompasses
familiar forms of taxation as special cases of a general and analytically convenient
model. The model allows the comparative incidence of alternative forms of
taxation to be examined for a broad class of policy tools without additional
calculations on the effect of individual tax reforms. 
It is well known that the form of an excise tax affects market structure 
nonuniformly in imperfectly competitive industries. In the monopoly case, the
comparative incidence of ad valorem and speciﬁc tax instruments has been
thoroughly treated by Suits and Musgrave (1953). Recent research has extended
the distinction to varying circumstances of homogeneous product oligopoly. In an
important paper, Delipalla and Keen (1992) provide a systematic comparison of
tax incidence between the two instruments and ﬁnd that ad valorem taxes 
welfare-dominate speciﬁc taxes both in industries with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms and
in free-entry oligopoly equilibria.
The comparative incidence of alternative tax instruments generally centers on
the relative efﬁciency in which a tax achieves a given transfer of revenue. The
conventional methodology is to consider revenue neutral tax reforms from a
baseline equilibrium point. The methodological approach suggested here simpliﬁes
the distinction between equal-yield instruments by isolating the revenue transfer
effect of taxation from the rotation effect of taxation on after-tax demand. This 
approach allows the comparative incidence of ad valorem and speciﬁc taxes to be
derived as a special case of a general ﬁnding that changes in industry output and
social surplus are positively-related to changes in the output elasticity of the tax
schedule. For a given transfer of revenue, it is shown that relatively output-elastic
tax schedules welfare-dominate regulatory controls which are less responsive to
changes in the equilibrium market quantity. The aforementioned result of Delipalla
and Keen (1992) is a special case of this general ﬁnding. It also follows that
degressive sales taxes, which levy higher rates at higher market prices, dominate
ad valorem taxes from the welfare perspective.
The methodology used here allows formal conditions to be derived in which
taxation expands industry output and generates efﬁciency gain in noncompetitive
environments. For a homogeneous product oligopoly with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms,
both speciﬁc and ad valorem taxes are known to reduce industry output and lead
to efﬁciency loss [see, for example, Seade (1985) and Stern (1987)]. This familiar
result does not hold for the entire range of policy tools, however, as Tam (1991)
1demonstrates for the case of degressive taxation of a monopolized industry. In this
paper, Tam’s result is formally connected with the literature on oligopoly taxation 
1In Tam’s model, the tax is based on the price charged by a monopolist. Such a tax may be
implemented equivalently as a sales tax with a variable rate, whence the price tax conceptually belongs
to the class of degressive excise taxes considered by Shilling (1969). 
and general conditions are derived for regulatory policy to increase output and
enhance economic efﬁciency.
The general framework employed in this paper also allows for the analysis of
multiple instruments within a tax structure and thus encompasses the dual policy
approaches pursued by Stern (1987) and Myles (1996). Speciﬁcally, the paper
shows that output-elastic tax schedules may be constructed through the use of unit
and ad valorem tax instruments, which corresponds with the dual policy
considered by Myles (1996). Such a tax policy generates efﬁciency gain whenever
the output elasticity of the tax schedule exceeds a critical value determined by
various market parameters, and, when appropriately designed, eliminates the
welfare loss due to imperfect competition entirely.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, a
framework is constructed to examine taxation under various circumstances of 
homogeneous product oligopoly. Section 3 develops a methodological approach
for the analysis of tax incidence and derives comparative statics effects for the
change in industry output, output per ﬁrm and, in the free-entry case, the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms. Section 4 considers the comparative incidence of a
wide range of regulatory instruments. Section 5 discusses the welfare potential of
taxation in noncompetitive environments and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The oligopoly model 
Consider an oligopoly equilibrium comprised of n ﬁrms which produce a 
homogeneous good. The output of ﬁrm i is denoted by yi and industry output by 
Y 5 o y . The inverse demand function, P(Y), is assumed to be negatively-sloped i i
and twice continuously differentiable. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is 
p 5 P(Y)y 2 c( y ), (1) i i i 
where c( y ), the cost function of ﬁrm i, is henceforth assumed identical for each i
ﬁrm. 
Strategic interaction among producers is described in the model by the
conjectural variations parameter d5dY /dy , where d is treated as a constant i
throughout. It is well known that the conjectural variations model, in which each
ﬁrm correctly predicts the effect of its actions on the industry equilibrium, reduces
to special cases of perfectly competitive behavior (d50), Cournot–Nash behavior 
(d51), and tacit collusion (d5n).
Conﬁning attention to symmetric equilibria, the ﬁrst- and second-order con-
ditions for a representative ﬁrm are 
py 5 P 1dyPY 2 cy 5 0 (2) 
and 
2 pyy 5 2dPY 1d yPYY 2 cyy , 0, (3) 
respectively. First-order condition (2) may be expressed in terms of an average
ﬁrm as 
py 5P 1gYPY 2 cy 5 0, (4) 
where g 5d /n [ (0,1] limits attention to noncompetitive environments.
Throughout, we refer to the case in which n is ﬁxed as the Generalized Cournot 
model and to that in which n is endogenous as the Free Entry Oligopoly model.
The number of ﬁrms in the model of Free Entry Oligopoly is treated as a
continuous variable following Seade (1980a), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
Entry occurs in the industry until proﬁts are driven to zero, whence the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms, ne, solves 
p 5P(ny )y 2 c( y ) 5 0, (5) e e e 
where ye denotes the output level of a representative ﬁrm in a symmetric oligopoly
equilibrium. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms is determined simultaneously with ye
using ﬁrst-order condition (4) and entry condition (5).2 
The usual conditions for existence and stability of an oligopoly equilibrium are
imposed. Following Dixit (1986) and Seade (1980b), 
k . 0, (6) 
where k 5 1 2 cyy /dPY, and 
l5 2 [pyy 1 n(1 2g )(P 1gYPYY )] . 0. (7) Y 
Expression (7), a necessary condition for a maximum, requires the marginal proﬁt
of a representative ﬁrm to decrease with the sum of its own output plus the
conjectured output response of rival ﬁrms. 
3. Positive effects of taxation 
Tax incidence is examined with regard to an arbitrary tax schedule that is
3imposed at the zero tax position. The net effect of a regulatory instrument (or
combination of instruments) on the market equilibrium is modeled through the use
of a shift parameter in the tax function, which allows alternative regulatory tools to
be nested in a single, analytically convenient framework. The methodology 
2It is assumed throughout that n is unique, as is the case when ﬁxed costs are sunk; see Vickers 
(1989).
e 
3While an initial zero tax position is considered here for clarity of results, generalization is
straightforward. 
encompasses a wide range of tax instruments as special cases involving different
combinations of level effects and pivotal rotations of the tax schedule.
Consider a tax of t(Y) per unit of output, which results in a proﬁt for ﬁrm i of 
p 5 B(Y)y 2 c( y ) (19)i i i 
where B(Y)5P(Y)2t(Y) is the net price producer i receives after the tax. This 
formulation of the tax schedule nests several familiar forms of taxation as special
S Vcases, including the speciﬁc tax, t5t , the ad valorem tax, t5t P(Y), and the dual 
S Vpolicy of speciﬁc and ad valorem taxation, t5t 1t P(Y).
Next, let u denote a shift parameter in the tax schedule such that t5t(Y;u ). The
shift variable is interpreted as a structural tax parameter that generalizes various
policy instruments available to a regulator. Without loss of generality, a vertical
upward shift (or level effect) of the tax schedule at the equilibrium point, Ye, is 
described by the condition t (Y ;u ).0, while a clockwise (resp. counterclockwise)u e
rotation of the tax schedule through the equilibrium point is represented by the
condition t (Y ;u ),0 (resp..0). The level effect of the tax schedule at the initial Yu e
equilibrium point represents the unit value of the revenue transfer to the regulator.
Thus, for the arbitrary tax structures t i and t j, equal yield policy instruments may
i j 4be described quite conveniently by the condition t (Y ;u )5t (Y ;u ).u e u e
For a given unit revenue transfer, t5t (Y ;u ), it is helpful to deﬁne for future u e
reference the output elasticity of the tax schedule as C52t Y /t . The output Yu u
elasticity of the tax schedule measures the sensitivity of the tax rate to changes in
the equilibrium level of output. A policy of speciﬁc taxation involves t 5tS andu 
t 50, which implies C50, while a policy of ad valorem taxation involves Yu 
t 5PtV and t 5P tV, whence C 5h where h52P Y /P is the output elasticity of u Yu Y Y
demand. 
Proposition 1. In the Generalized Cournot model, taxation affects industry output 
as 
dY 2 ntus1 2gCd ]5]]]]. (8) du l 
In the model of Free Entry Oligopoly, taxation affects industry output as 
dY tuspyy 2 ng 2PY(C 2 E)d
 
]5]]]]]]], (9)
 du PYpyy 
4The reader should note that while equal-yield policy instruments, as described above, are not fully
revenue neutral, tax structures that meet this deﬁnition involve an identical ‘ﬁrst round’ effect on tax
revenue. This deﬁnition of equal-yield tax structures extends in straightforward fashion the concept of
‘matched pairs’ of taxes introduced by Suits and Musgrave (1953) and provides the conceptual
underpinning for tax reforms of the type considered by Delipalla and Keen (1992). 
where 
E 5 2  P Y /P . (10) YY Y 
Proof. The ﬁrst part (8) is derived by applying the implicit function theorem to
(4), once (1) is replaced by (19), then aggregating across n ﬁrms. Again replacing 
(1) with (19), the second part (9) is derived by perturbing (4) and (5), with
application of the envelope theorem to (5). The resulting system of equations is 
2l (PY 1gYP )y dy tu 1gYtYuYY GF G F
 F(1 2g )P Y P ( y2) dn 5 yt Gdu. (11) y Y u 
Denoting the coefﬁcient matrix in (11) by S, its determinant is 
Det(S ) 5 P y2 pyy . (12) Y 
The effect of a change in tax structure on the output of a representative ﬁrm and
on the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is 
dy 2gt sC 2 Ed 




dn tu(pyy 2 ng(1 2g )PY(C 2 E))

]5]]]]]]]]], (14)
 du yPYpyy 
respectively. The effect of a change in tax structure on industry output is 
calculated from (13) and (14) as dY /du5n(dy /du )1y(dn /du ), which yields (9).h 
The output effect in (8) depends on the level effect of the tax, t , the conjectural u
variations parameter, and the output elasticity of the tax schedule, C. The output 
effect in (9) depends on these same parameters and on the value of E, which is the
elasticity of the slope of inverse demand. Taxation increases industry output in (8)
and (9) when the tax schedule is sufﬁciently output-elastic.
For special cases of speciﬁc taxation and ad valorem taxation, a positive tax rate
reduces industry output, as noted elsewhere in the literature. In the Generalized
Cournot model, the denominator of (8) is positive by condition (7). For the case of
speciﬁc taxation, the numerator of (8) becomes 2ntS ,0, while, for the case of ad 
valorem taxation, the numerator of (8) becomes 2n(P1gYP )tV ,0 by (4). In the Y
Free Entry Oligopoly model, speciﬁc taxation affects industry output in (9) as 
dY ngs1 1 k td S 
]5]]], 0,du pyy 
where the inequality holds by stability condition (6) and the second-order
condition (3). Hence a speciﬁc tax leads to a reduction in industry output as in 
Besley (1989) and Delipalla and Keen (1992). For the case of ad valorem 
taxation, the output effect is 
dY ng [Pk 1 (P 1gYP )]tV 
]5]]]]]]
Y ], 0,du pyy 
where the inequality holds by conditions (4), (5), and (6).
 
Proposition 2. A tax is over-shifted into price in the Generalized Cournot model
 
iff 
C , E 2 k ,f g (15) 
A tax is over-shifted into price in the model of Free Entry Oligopoly iff 
C , E. (16) 
Proof. Taxation is over-shifted when the change in the consumer price exceeds the
unit value of the tax, dP/du .t . Recognizing that the change in the consumer u
price is dP/du5P (dY /du ), it follows that over-shifting of a tax into price occurs Y
in the Generalized Cournot model iff 
nP t s1 2 gCd 1lt , 0 (17) Y u u 
Expression (17) reduces to 
ngP t  (C 1 k 2 E) . 0.Y u 
Noting that t .0 under the tax yields (15). u
In the Free Entry Oligopoly model, over-shifting of a tax into price occurs iff 
tuspyy 2 ng 2PYsC 2 Edd 2 tupyy , 0. 
Collection of terms completes the proof.h 
Corollary. The over-shifting of a tax, t i , is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient 
j j i i jcondition, for the over-shifting of an equal-yield tax, t , ;t ±t such that C .C . 
Proposition 2 and the corollary encompass familiar results on the incidence of
oligopoly taxation. For example, a speciﬁc tax is over-shifted in a Generalized
Cournot model with linear costs iff E.1 as in Seade (1985) and Stern (1987),
while, in the model of Free Entry Oligopoly, a unit tax is over-shifted iff E.0 as 
derived by Besley (1989). The corollary also generalizes the ﬁnding of Delipalla
and Keen (1992) that over-shifting of speciﬁc taxes is a necessary, but not a
sufﬁcient condition, for over-shifting of ad valorem taxes. It also follows that ad 
valorem taxes are shifted into price to a greater degree than are taxes with a 
relatively stronger rotation effect, such as the degressive taxes discussed by 
Shilling (1969) and Tam (1991).5 
4. Tax incidence and social welfare 
We next consider the welfare implications of tax incidence. Social surplus is
denoted as a function of the structural tax parameter, u, by 
Y(u ) 
W(u ) 5 E P z dz 2 nc y(u )s d  s d (18) 
0 
in the Generalized Cournot model and by 
Y(u ) 
W(u ) 5 E P z dz 2 n(u )c y(u )s d  s d (19) 
0 
in the Free Entry Oligopoly model. The tax revenue collected by the regulator is a
6pure transfer that is unrelated to welfare measures (18) and (19). From the zero
tax position, we have: 
Proposition 3. In the Generalized Cournot model, taxation affects social surplus 
as 
dW 2 ntu(P 2 cy )(1 2gC )

]5]]]]]]]. (20)
 du l 
In the model of Free Entry Oligopoly, taxation affects social surplus as 
dW 2gntu(P 2 cy )(C 2 E)

]5]]]]]]]. (21)
 du pyy 
Proof. Differentiating (18) for the welfare effect of taxation, 
dW dY 
]5 (P 2 cy )S D] (22) du du 
in the Generalized Cournot model. Expression (22), combined with (8) yields
(20). 
5One functional form of a degressive tax is the sales tax t5t(Y)P(Y), where t9(Y),0. Such a tax 
varies inversely with output level and corresponds with the price tax considered by Tam when 
t(Y)5tp /Y. 
6The model is developed in partial equilibrium and does not consider distortionary effects of taxation
in other economic sectors or administrative losses of tax revenue. 
In the Free Entry Oligopoly model, the effect of taxation on social surplus is
found by differentiating (19), which yields 
dW dY dy dn 
] ] ] ]5PS D 2 nc S D S D 2 c .ydu du du du 
Substitution of (9), (13) and (14), making use of (5), completes the proof.h 
In (20) and (21), taxation leads to efﬁciency gain when the tax schedule is
sufﬁciently output-elastic, as l.0 by stability condition (7) and p ,0 by the 
second-order condition (3). 
y y  
Corollary. A tax schedule, t i , welfare-dominates an equal-yield tax schedule, t j,
j i i j;t ±t such that C .C . 
The corollary to Proposition 3 provides an analytically convenient benchmark
for assessing the comparative incidence of alternative tax instruments under
oligopoly. A tax policy i welfare-dominates an equal-yield tax policy j if and only 
if tax policy i involves a larger clockwise rotation of the tax schedule at the
equilibrium point. It follows readily that ad valorem taxation dominates speciﬁc
taxation from the welfare perspective, as in Delipalla and Keen (1992). The result
is also useful for assessing the welfare properties of other, less familiar tax forms.
Consider, for example, the comparative incidence of ad valorem and degressive 
taxation, where the degressive sales tax, t5tD(Y)P(Y), satisﬁes tD(Y),0. From the Y
zero tax position, an ad valorem tax satisﬁes C5h, while a degressive sales tax, 
D D D D Dt 5t P  and t 5t P  1t P, satisﬁes C5t1h, where t52t Y  /t is the output u Yu Y Y Y
elasticity of the degressive tax rate. Given the larger rotation effect induced by the
latter tax, it follows that degressive taxation dominates ad valorem taxation from 
the welfare perspective.
Tax schedules that are sufﬁciently output-elastic increase industry output and
enhance economic efﬁciency. For example, if a degressive sales tax is imposed in
a oligopoly with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, industry output and social surplus
increase by Propositions 1 and 3 if t1h.1/g, or, using ﬁrst-order condition (4), 
if 
gPt . cy. (23) 
In expression (23), a degressive sales tax expands industry output and increases
social surplus when the conjectured value of a decrease in the sales tax from a
marginal expansion of output exceeds its marginal cost.
Alternatively, it is possible to construct an output-elastic tax schedule by
combining multiple tax instruments, as in the dual policy of ad valorem and 
speciﬁc taxation considered by Stern (1987) and Myles (1996). A convenient
policy implication emerges in the comparison of an ad valorem tax structure, 
j Vjt 5 Pt , with a tax schedule that combines ad valorem taxation and unit 
i V Sisubsidization, t 5 Pt 2 t . At the zero tax position, equal yield tax structures 
i j V s Vi j(t 5t 5t ) must satisfy t 5 Pt 2 t 5 Pt , whence it must be the case that u u u uV V S i V Vi j i jt . t for any non-zero subsidy rate, t . Clearly, then, C 5 P t  /t . P t  /t 5Y u Y u 
C j and it follows directly that a dual policy of ad valorem taxation and unit 
subsidization welfare dominates the use of ad valorem taxation alone. 
Propositions 1 and 3 are summarized as follows. 
Proposition 4. If C.(resp.,)g 21 in the Generalized Cournot model, then 
1. industry output rises (resp. falls) with taxation;
2. social surplus increases (resp. decreases) with taxation. 
If C.(resp.,) E in the Free Entry Oligopoly model, then 
1. output per ﬁrm increases (resp. decreases) with taxation;
2. taxation is shifted by less (resp. more) than 100 percent into price;
3. social surplus increases (resp. decreases) with taxation. 
Proposition 4 extends several familiar results in the literature on oligopoly
taxation. In the Generalized Cournot model, both industry output and social
surplus decline under unit taxation as in Seade (1985) and Stern (1987). Under ad 
valorem taxation, social surplus also declines as n,g 2 1 holds by ﬁrst-order
condition (4), although the effect is less pronounced than in the case of speciﬁc
taxation. In the Free Entry Oligopoly model, Proposition 4 reduces to Proposition
1 of Besley (1989) for the case of a speciﬁc tax, whereas part 3 is as in Delipalla
and Keen (1992) for the case of an ad valorem tax. 
5. Tax structure and economic efﬁciency 
This section describes the corrective potential of a wide class of alternative tax
structures. In particular, attention is conﬁned to regulatory structures that lead to
the social optimum. Thus, the objective is contextually similar to that of Stern
(1987) and Myles (1996), although a single generalized tax structure is employed
rather than one of dual policy. For expositional purposes, attention is limited here
to the Free Entry Oligopoly model in order to parallel the development of Myles
(1996) for dual policy in the Generalized Cournot case.
Consider a representative ﬁrm in an oligopoly industry that faces an equilibrium 
tax rate of t5 t(Y) for each unit of output produced. After-tax proﬁts of the ﬁrm 
are given by 
p 5 P(Y)y 2 c( y) 2 t(Y)y, (24) 
whence the equilibrium in the Free Entry Oligopoly model is completely
characterized by 
P(ny) 5 c ( y) 2 dyP (ny) 1 t(ny) 1 dyt (ny),y Y Y (25) 
and 
yP(ny) 5 c( y) 1 yt(ny). (26) 
The socially optimal y,n pair satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with
the welfare expression (19), 
P(ny) 5 cy( y), (27) 
and 
yP(ny) 5 c( y). (28) 
The following Proposition extends the result of Myles (1996). 
Proposition 5. In the Free Entry Oligopoly model, a tax schedule always exists
that eliminates the welfare loss due to imperfect competition entirely. 
Proof. It is necessary to show that if y* and n* satisfy (27) and (28), they will
also satisfy (25) and (26). First notice that if the revenue transfer under a tax
schedule is nonzero at a social optimum, then it is obvious that (26) cannot be
satisﬁed by y*, n*. To complete the proof, it is necessary to demonstrate that if the
revenue transfer at the social optimum is zero, then (25) will be satisﬁed by y*, 
n*. 
Suppose that y* and n* satisfy (27) and (28) and let the tax schedule be 
represented by the conditions t(n*y*)50 and ty(n*y*)5Py(n*y*). Then, it follows 
immediately from (27) that y*, n* also satisfy (25). h 
This simple result conﬁrms intuition and assures that a tax schedule can restore
full optimality in noncompetitive environments. The optimal tax schedule pivots
after-tax demand horizontally at the socially optimal price, thereby forcing
imperfect competitors to act as price-takers in the market. 7 One means of 
7This result is consistent with Myles (1996), who ﬁnds in the Generalized Cournot case that a dual
policy that combines an ad valorem tax of 100% and a speciﬁc subsidy equal to marginal cost
eliminates the welfare loss due to imperfect competition. 
implementing such a tax is a degressive tax of the form t5P(Y)2P(n*y*). In the 
face of such a tax, a representative ﬁrm makes proﬁts of 
* *p 5 P(Y)y 2 c( y) 2 (P(Y) 2 P(n y  ))y 
and behaves according to the ﬁrst-order condition 
p 5 P 1gYP 2 c 1 P(n y  ) 2 P 2gYP 5 0.y Y y * *  Y (29) 
Expression (29) reduces to P(n*y*)2cy( y)50, whence y5y*, P(ny)5P(n*y*) by 
(26), and the social optimum is achieved with a single policy instrument. This
result is somewhat contrary to the conventional intuition that dual policy
instruments are required to correct two market distortions. A single tax of a
sufﬁciently degressive nature corrects two market distortions with one instrument,
which underscores the importance of the shape of the tax schedule in determining
equilibrium outcomes under oligopoly.
The optimal tax schedule may also be implemented using a dual policy
approach. To the extent that regulatory tools have differential impacts on the level
and slope of the after-tax demand function, it is possible to achieve a social
optimum through various combinations of tax instruments. In the context of the
present model, an optimal dual pricing policy employs one instrument to rotate
demand horizontally and another to adjust the level effect to the social price. This
simple, parenthetical observation provides sharp relief to the comparative inci-
dence of individual policy instruments, as unit taxes, ad valorem taxes, and
degressive taxes involve respectively larger rotations of after-tax demand for a
given level effect. 
6. Concluding comments 
This paper employs a shift parameter in a generalized tax schedule to analyze
the incidence of taxation under oligopoly. The methodological approach en-
compasses a wide range of regulatory instruments and allows for convenient
policy comparison of alternative tax structures. The paper demonstrates that the
degree of tax shifting in an oligopoly is inversely related to the output elasticity of
the tax schedule. An output-elastic tax schedule is associated with greater industry
output, increased output per ﬁrm, and, in the case of free entry oligopoly, a larger
reduction in industry ﬁxed costs relative to a tax schedule that is less responsive to
the equilibrium level of output. The welfare consequences of taxation under
oligopoly thus improve with revenue neutral reforms to relatively output-elastic
tax schedules, whence degressive taxes welfare-dominate ad valorem taxes vis a ´
vis the welfare superiority of ad valorem over speciﬁc taxation.
The paper also presents formal conditions in which taxation leads to increased
output and efﬁciency gain. The results conﬁrm those of other studies that
unipartite policies of speciﬁc or ad valorem taxation unambiguously lead to 
efﬁciency loss in oligopolistic industries with a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. Conversely,
degressive taxes and dual policies of ad valorem and speciﬁc taxation generate
efﬁciency gain whenever the output elasticity of the tax schedule exceeds a critical
value determined by various market parameters.
The methodology employed in this paper may be used for the further
examination of tax incidence under oligopoly. The model allows the effects of
taxation to be conveniently analyzed for a broad class of oligopoly equilibria and
for a wide range of regulatory instruments. Future implementation of this
methodological approach may provide greater latitude for the evaluation of
alternative tax structures and permit the corrective potential of various ﬁscal
instruments to be more comprehensively illuminated than present space allows. 
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